"There is one and only one social responsibility of business -to use its resources and engage in activities designed to increase its pro…ts..." Milton Friedman "Corporate social responsibility is best seen as the management of risk, as the avoidance of damages to the company's reputation." Financial Times, July 7,
2004.
There are a plethora of past studies examining the relationship of a …rm's …nancial performance to its level of corporate social responsibility (CSR). In short, the studies at best show there is a nominal relation between the two (see Elfenbein (2007) for an extensive survey). If CSR does not provide any …nancial bene…t, in the spirit of Friedman (1970) , it seems that managers should then spend their time and e¤orts in other areas that are expected to actually enhance …rm value. Indeed, Institutional Shareholder Services (ISS), an MSCI brand, admonishes investment managers in their "2011 U.S. Proxy Voting Guidelines Summary" to often vote against CSR type initiatives in order to "protect shareholder value." Nonetheless, CSR seems increasingly important to at least some investors, as many companies now report annually on their social performance, and independent organizations such as KLD Analytics provide regular corporate accountability reporting. CSR also seems increasingly important to managers; a survey by the Economist magazine 1 reports some 56% of managers consider CSR as a "high" or "very high" priority. Further, the Economist reports 87% of …rms now have a formal CSR program in place. Echoing …rm sentiment, some MBA program ranking schemes now include a standalone category for CSR. This all suggests that there must be some aspects of CSR that are valuable. In this spirit, the Economist reports that while only some 6.5% of managers report that CSR increases revenue, most managers claim they instead use CSR to secure a brand and rep-1 January 7th, 2008 utation. They summarize it in this way:
"Most of the rhetoric on CSR may be about doing the right thing and trumping competitors, but much of the reality is plain risk management. It involves limiting the damage to the brand and the bottom line that can be in ‡icted by a bad press and consumer boycotts, as well as dealing with the threat of legal action."
Economist, January 7,2008 Thus, in practice, it seems that there is a belief that a primary value of CSR is to protect a …rm's value. In this paper, we explore this important notion both theoretically and empirically.
There are at least two leading theories of CSR as protection. Godfrey (2005) develops an informal model of protection where …rms engage in voluntary philanthropic acts to build a reservoir of goodwill (i.e., "moral capital") from which to draw upon during an adverse event. An alternative mechanism proposed by Minor and Morgan (2011) is that protection comes from improving the posteriors of investors. In particular, those …rms that engage in CSR activities related to an adverse event are given more of the bene…t of the doubt concerning their negligence related to the event. For example, if a …rm engages in substantive (positive) environmental CSR, should it become involved in an environmental disaster, as a result of Bayesian updating, it is less likely the …rm is guilty of negligence, reducing its expected event cost.
We formalize both of these theories to develop sharper and contrasting empirical predictions. While both predict protection of …rm value upon an event, there are also important di¤erences. First, Godfrey (2005) predicts …rm protection comes from a …rm contributing to philanthropic activities, which are generally not related to a particular adverse event.
In contrast, Minor and Morgan (2011) argue that protection only comes from engaging in those activities that are related to such an event. Second, after we extend both of these theories by considering what happens to the incident rate of di¤erent types of …rms, we see further di¤erences. In particular, those …rms building moral capital should experience increased incident rates due to moral hazard: being assured of some increased protection encourages some managers to be less careful in avoiding a disaster. In contrast, protection as portrayed in Minor and Morgan (2011) is derived from being more conscientious, and thus incident rates for these protected …rms should be lower.
We also complement the extant literature by introducing disingenuous builders of moral capital. In Godfrey (2005) , all actors and activities are transparent. However, in a world where managers might act strategically, some can choose to free-ride on the positive image of building moral capital by super…cially engaging in CSR. The net result of such …rms is that we should observe diminished protection, if not increased costs, from engaging in CSR.
The notion of participating in CSR to protect …rm value is related to a growing literature on …rm self-regulation. In early work, Maxwell et al. (2000) extend the economic theory of regulation by adding voluntary actions by …rms to reduce pollution under the shadow of regulation. Maxwell and Decker (2006) show this force also operates in the other direction: voluntary actions can reduce regulation intensity. This activity helps …rms engaging in voluntary actions by means of reduced regulation and therefore expected cost. Baron (2010) adds that such self-regulation can also arise from altruistic managers. Whatever the source of self-regulation, it can increase …rm value. In fact, Mackey et al. (2007) argue that even voluntary actions that are costly in expected value terms can add …rm value with su¢ cient investor demand for such actions. Thus, this paper complements this stream of literature by exploring yet another potential bene…t of self-regulation: Those self regulation activities categorized as CSR can also help protect …rm value during adverse events.
In terms of empirical work on protection by means of CSR, Godfrey et al. (2009) test the moral capital idea in Godfrey (2005) by conducting an event study on 178 "opportunistically drawn" …rm events. They …nd that from the set of …rms that they select to study, those that are engaging in philanthropic focused activities enjoy a reduced loss in …rm value when facing regulatory and legal actions against them. However, …rms engaging in more pro…t-centric CSR do not enjoy such protection. Similarly, Jacobs et al. (2010) also …nd that philanthropic gifts provide positive …rm value. In contrast, Hillman and Keim (2001) …nd just the opposite: engaging in CSR for primary stakeholders (i.e., pro…tcentric CSR) increases …rm value whereas engaging in CSR for secondary stakeholders (i.e., philanthropic) decrease …rm value.
In terms of negative CSR, Capelle-Blancard and Laguna (2010) study stock market reactions to 64 chemical plant and re…nery explosions. They …nd that those …rms with poor environmental records are punished more harshly. If we count voluntary pollution abatement as CSR, we …nd that positive CSR also hurts …rm value. Fisher-Vanden and Thorburn (2011) show that …rms that increase participation in voluntary emissions reduction lose …rm value. Similarly, Jacobs et al. (2010) …nd that self-disclosed increases in environmental performance yield a reduction in …rm value. Lyon et al. (2013) …nd a nuance in the consequences of positive CSR for …rms in China: the penalty for positive CSR diminishes when …rms are state-owned or in high-polluting industries. We complement these works by formalizing and testing mechanisms that can generate and reconcile these con ‡icting …ndings.
With theoretical predictions in hand, we then explore the CSR activity of large US public companies from 1991 through 2012. We …nd that those …rms engaged in CSR related to adverse events enjoy substantial protection-an average of close to $1 billion of protected …rm value-and also lower event rates. In contrast, we observe that …rms that engage in philanthropic CSR unrelated to incidences face events more often and do not enjoy protection from their CSR e¤orts. In fact, in some cases, they are even further punished upon an event.
We see this paper's contribution as twofold: First, it is the …rst paper to formalize and contrast possible mechanisms that generate protection from CSR, an important and primary motivation of managers to engage in CSR. In doing so, we extend the theory by considering incident rates as a way to distinguish between mechanisms. We also introduce disingenuous …rms within the moral capital framework, which identi…es those cases where moral capital building might fail to protect …rms. Second, using a novel dataset covering 22 years, that is to our knowledge the largest of its kind, we document for the …rst time the relation of CSR to event incident rates. We are also able to identify those cases where CSR provides protection and shed some light on when CSR actually can help or hurt …rms upon an event.
The balance of the paper is organized as follows: In the …rst section we present a unifying model of CSR as protection, formalizing both Godfrey (2005) 
The Model
Assume managers of each …rm type choose their level of CSR activities as well as direct e¤ort to manage business risk, where risk is the risk of an adverse event. We abstract away from any agency problems and assume managers maximize …rm value. The above diagram provides the timeline of the game. Managers make two CSR level decisions:
whether or not to invest in operational CSR (i.e., CSR Investments) and whether or not to contribute to charitable CSR (i.e., CSR Contributions). Formally, we denote these CSR choices as a vector t = (t C ; t we ); where t j 2 fH; Lg for j 2 fC; Ig: H (L) denotes a hightype (low-type) …rm. 2 We assume that CSR type is reported through CSR reporting and is thus publicly observed . The element t C (t I ) denotes a …rm's binary choice of CSR Contribution (Investment). While it costs zero for a …rm to be a low-type, choosing to be a high-type costs a …rm c j . CSR cost is the realization of a privately observed random variable having support [0; 1) over an atomless distribution function F j ( ). For simplicity assume that draws from F C ( ) and F I ( ) are IID across and within …rms.
A manager also chooses a level of e¤ort e 0; which is unobservable. Manager e¤ort helps keep a …rm from an undesirable outcome, as explained below. E¤ort costs are increasing and convex. For simplicity, suppose that the cost of e units of e¤ort is C (e) = 1 2 e 2 . Thus, whereas c j is a …xed cost to engage in higher CSR, C (e) is the ongoing cost of responsibility.
The combination of CSR activity and managerial e¤ort determine the business risk state 2 fh; lg of the …rm. If an adverse event occurs while the …rm is operating in a high risk state, it will prove more costly than if it is in a low risk state, as discussed below.
With probability t I e the low risk state is realized, while the high risk state occurs with complementary probability. The parameter t I represents the in ‡uence of CSR investment activity on the business risk state, where 0 < L < H . In other words, CSR Investment reduces the chance of being in the high risk state. Following the state realization, nature then determines whether an adverse event occurs. With probability p an event occurs in state ; where 0 < p l < p h . That is, events are less likely to occur if the …rm is operating in the low risk state than in the high risk state. Note CSR Contributions do not a¤ect the return to e¤ort in keeping a …rm out of a high risk state. Hence, a …rm with or without CSR Contributions can have either L or H :
Stakeholders (e.g., investors and regulators) only observe whether an event, E; has occurred and the …rm's level of CSR Investment (i.e., and thus t I ) and CSR Contribution.
Since a manager's e¤ort is unobservable, stakeholders must make an assessment of the likelihood that the …rm was operating in a high risk state conditional on an event occurring.
That is, (t) denotes the (equilibrium) beliefs of stakeholders that the …rm was in the high risk state conditional on an event occurring and the …rm's level of CSR activity. A …rm triggering an event from a high risk state can be thought of as having been "at fault,"
whereas if the event was triggered from a low risk state the …rm is not "at fault." A …rm then su¤ers loss K, scaled by the stakeholders' belief (t) that the …rm was operating in a high risk state. That is, being "at fault" is more costly than not being "at fault."
However, this loss upon an event is tempered by the …rm's potential building of moral capital. As explained in Godfrey (2005) , through a CSR Contribution a …rm builds a reservoir of goodwill that can either provide an increased bene…t of the doubt or lessen the stakeholder-induced penalty upon a bad event (or both). We capture this potential bene…t by the expression 1 M I t C =R C +1 in equation (2) : Increased moral capital M means an increased bene…t upon an event.
To summarize, the expected pro…ts of a …rm with private cost parameters c j choosing public CSR types t j and private e¤ort e are
Here, I j is an indicator function which equals one if the manager chooses a high level of CSR Investment (and) or Contribution. I denote status quo pro…t 0 . In short, expected pro…t is then status quo pro…t, minus the total cost of CSR, minus the cost of e¤ort, minus the unconditional expected cost of an event.
To summarize the various states, Figure 1 provides a schematic for all of the possible outcomes:
[ Figure 1 here]
There exist unique values (e L ; e H ) corresponding to the equilibrium e¤ort of a …rm. To see the claim regarding (e L ; e H ) , notice that for given a t c , the optimal e¤ort choice for a manager of …rm type t is a globally concave problem having as its solution:
To close the model, it remains to determine equilibrium beliefs. Recall that stakeholders know a …rm's type and can thus deduce its equilibrium e¤ort. Hence, from Bayes'rule, upon an event, stakeholders hold belief
Thus, any equilibrium e¤ort levels given t c simultaneously solve
The optimal pair of t I and t C chosen is then simply a function of comparing pro…ts from e L and e H given each t C 2 fH; Lg : In equilibrium, there exists some c I such that when …xing the choice of t C ; we have the same level of pro…t whether that manager chooses her …rm to be a low (L) or high (H) type there is some c C such that the manager is indi¤erent between choosing t C 2 fH; Lg:
This analysis provides the …rst proposition:
In equilibrium, managers of high-type (low-type) …rms exert e¤ ort e H ( e L ) as given in (5) and face CSR cost c I c I (c I > c I );where c I solves equation (6) .
We next need a Lemma to prove our propositions concerning changes in …rm values
upon an event and incident rate of events.
What this Lemma tells us is that if we compare two …rms that are the same on the dimension of CSR Contribution t C , even though the high-type …rm has a greater return to e¤ort, it will still produce enough e¤ort such that L e L < H e H . This yields an important empirical prediction, as this inequality is necessary for the CSR investing …rm to be less likely to have an event, as shown in the next proposition.
Proposition 2 Compared with CSR Investment low-type …rms, CSR Investment high-type …rms have events less often and lose less value upon an event.
The intuition of the above proposition is with CSR Investment, the manager essentially internalizes the cost of an adverse event and increases her e¤ort to reduce it. This increased e¤ort both reduces the chance of an event and also reduces the change in …rm value upon an event because investors now consider it less likely the event was caused by negligence.
This proposition then provides two key predictions that we can test in the data while holding CSR Contribution level constant: increased CSR investment level both reduces the event incident rate and reduces the loss of …rm value upon an event. The next proposition considers the parallel case of changes in levels of CSR Contributions, holding a given CSR Investment level constant.
Proposition 3 Compared with CSR Contribution low-type …rms, CSR Contribution
high-type …rms have events more often and lose less value upon an event.
The intuition for this proposition is that when a …rm is provided a reservoir of goodwill to draw upon during an adverse event, this induces moral hazard on behalf of the manager.
That is, due to the goodwill protection, she now puts in less e¤ort since an adverse event will prove less costly. Consequently, the …rm's incident rate is increased. As far as we are aware, this is a novel …nding; the extant literature stresses the protection value of goodwill building upon on an event. However, there has been no discussion of how this can induce moral hazard. Nonetheless, even with such moral hazard, the …rm still enjoys a net protection bene…t upon an event; as shown in the appendix, the positive e¤ect of the goodwill reservoir dominates the negative e¤ect of this increased chance of negligence. This last proposition also reveals that comparing incident rates as a function of the type of CSR (i.e., Contribution versus Investment) can help us disentangle the sources of protection from CSR.
Empirical examination 2.1 General strategy
The empirical setting is product markets where the event is a product recall. These events are often seen by the investment committee as a potential shock to a …rm's value and reputation due to their signaling nature (Davidson and Worrell (1992) provide a review of past product recall literature. See also Hartman (1987) for a hedonic model treatment of recalls). These types of events are arguably more exogenous than some events studied in the extant literature, such as choosing to join a CSR organization (e.g., Fisher-Vanden and Thornburn (2011)) or disclose one's intention to increase CSR (e.g., Jacobs et al. (2010)).
Our empirical strategy has two facets. First, we will test if …rms engaged in CSR Investment (CSR Contributions) have a lesser (greater) incident rate. Second, we then test if those …rms engaged in each type of CSR experience a lesser loss in …rm value upon an event. I begin by reviewing the data characteristics and then turn to the event study methodology and regression model.
Data
The Data consist of three components. The …rst part is the abnormal returns of various …rms during our product recalls, which we describe in detail in the next section. The event returns are then merged with Compustat, the second set of data. For …rm control data of the S&P 500 …rms we have: annual sales ("Sales (net)"), asset value ("Assets-total"), market value ("common shares outstanding" "price-calender year-closing"), and percent of pro…ts per share ("EPS (Basic) -Exclude Extra. Items " "price-calender year-closing").
Actual product recall events were obtained by hand collection of product recall events of S&P 500 …rms as indexed by the Wall Street journal from 1991 through 2012. Although this categorization of product recalls is certainly not perfect, it is the primary source used by past product recall literature. Further, we wanted to have an ex-ante …xed criteria of selecting recalls to prevent subjective inclusion or exclusion on the part of the researcher.
We do note that recalls included in the Wall Street Journal press announcements are biased towards larger event recalls. However, the theory predicts that it is these large scale recalls where we will see the e¤ects, if any exist.
Occasionally some …rms had more than one event announcement in a year, most often a later press announcement related to the same event. For the data collection, we simply summed the abnormal returns together, following the methodology as shown below, by summing abnormal returns over event window days. Having more than one event in a year for a given …rm occurred for only 25 of the …rm/ event years, and these were almost exclusively for automobile companies. KLD conducts proprietary research to assign annual CSR ratings to publicly held …rms across various dimensions, including product markets. Their CSR ratings began in 1991, making it one of the oldest corporate accountability reporting sources. We use data from 1991 though 2012.
To match our theoretical predictions, we need to use a measure of CSR that is related to the event and another CSR activity that is not. In this spirit, we use CSR ratings on the dimensions of product markets and community reputation to respectively represent these activities. The former then captures the notion of investment in issue-related CSR (i.e., CSR Investments) and the latter proxies for the contribution of moral capital (i.e., CSR Contributions).
CSR reputation in product markets (i.e.,CSR Investments) can be thought of as a …rm's superior reputation earned from the conscientious creation, marketing, and distribution of its products. "Good" CSR will mean that a …rm typically embraces superior quality assurance procedures in the development and production of its products, conducts ethical marketing campaigns, provides products with extra social value, provides products to disadvantaged demographic groups, and generally faces product recalls voluntarily. In contrast, "Bad" CSR means that …rms are usually involved in regulation …ghts, su¤er safety violations, accept lower product safety standards, and conduct limited due diligence on their supply chain. For both kinds of CSR, we categorize …rms into three types, as follows. The lowest type, which we will call "Low" types, are involved in "Bad" things for the given type of CSR. The next type, "Medium" types, are not involved with "Bad" things, but neither are they involved in "Good" things-they are simply responsible corporate citizens. Finally, there are some exceptional …rms that not only avoid being involved in "Bad" things, but are also participating in some extra "Good" things. We dub these "High" types. We include a full summary of "Good" and "Bad" types of CSR used by KLD in the appendix. Table 1 reports the summary statistics for our primary variables. As can be seen, roughly 7% (13%) of …rm-years a …rm will earn a High Product (Community) reputation.
Meanwhile, some 74% (80%) of …rm-years fall in the middle of being classi…ed as high on the dimension of Product (Community) CSR. The balance of …rm-years are considered "Low" types. Now we consider our …rst primary theoretical prediction concerning event rates.
[ Table 1 about here]
The Risk of Incident
Recall, our propositions predict that …rms with high Product CSR should have lesser event incidence rates, whereas those …rms with high Community CSR should have greater event incidence rates. To test these predictions, since possible outcomes are only zero or one, we use a logit random-e¤ects panel regression. 3 We specify our full regression as
where i N 0; 2 : The variable CSR i;t 1 contains CSR ratings for …rm i based on the previously de…ned CSR typologies. The vector X i;t 1 contains …nancial controls, as outlined in the section (2:2) ; and also industry controls. Finally, the vector Y t contains year dummies.
With this regression, we can ask a simple question: is it the case that CSR reputation -either in terms of CSR Investments or CSR Contributions -is related to incident rates as theory predicts? Table 2 reports the results of this regression. Column (1) provides the baseline regression, which includes year …xed e¤ects but not …nancial and industry.
We …nd, as predicted by theory, high-type …rms involved in building moral capital through Community CSR are more likely to have an adverse event. For Product CSR, as consistent with theory, high-type …rms are less likely to have an adverse event. Even after including all of our discussed controls, the coe¢ cient estimates for either high-type of …rm are still signi…cant at the 1% or 5% level.
If we extend our main theory to medium-type …rms, these …rms should have the same direction of estimated e¤ect as high-type …rms, but the e¤ects should be attenuated. For
Community CSR, high-type Community CSR …rms have greater estimated coe¢ cients. A Wald test of equality of the high-and medium-type Community CSR coe¢ cients yields a 2 = 24:83 (p-value= :0000). We note that medium-type …rms have estimated coe¢ cients statistically no di¤erent from low-type …rms.
For Product CSR, medium-type …rms are less likely than low-type to have an event.
However, the magnitude of the estimates are no di¤erent statistically from the high-type
…rms: a Wald test yields 2 = :22 (i.e.,p-value= :649). In short, our empirical results are consistent with our theoretical predictions; however, we cannot empirically distinguish medium-and low-type community …rms from one another and we cannot distinguish high and medium-type Product CSR …rms from one another. That is, if we relabeled mediumtype Product CSR …rms as high-type and relabeled medium-type Community CSR …rms as low-types, the empirical results would perfectly align with the baseline theory results that explore binary CSR types.
[ Table 2 about here]
We also ran a Probit random-e¤ects model, the results of which are nearly identical and can be found in Table 3 .We now turn to our second primary prediction-the protection value of CSR. To do so, we utilize a …nancial event study.
Financial Event Study
Financial event studies are a common way to quantify the …nancial impact of an adverse …rm event. 4 The particular factor model I use is the commonly used Fama/ French model (see Fama and French (1997) ). Expected return in this setting is then estimated via:
That is, the return of the stock equals a …rm …xed e¤ect, plus a sensitivity to the general market return R M , sensitivity to small stocks versus large stocks (SM B), and …nally a sensitivity to high versus low book to market type stocks. Coe¢ cients are estimated from a time series just before, but disjoint, to the particular event of interest; here, following common practice, the estimation period begins 8 months prior and ends 30 days prior to the event. These coe¢ cient estimates are then used to predict the return during the event period. That is, the predicted return around the event period becomes:
We use this estimated returns model from the …rst step to predict what the expected returns are during the event of interest and then calculate the "abnormal return," de…ned as the di¤erence in actual return from the predicted return:
The cumulative abnormal return is then simply the sum of these returns. For this study, we …rst use the day before and the day of the event announcement as our "event window." This is the most stringent of windows; we want to minimize the e¤ect of any other previous or subsequent news confounds. We begin the window the day before, as is practice, to capture any "news leakage" the day before the event announcement. For a robustness check, we also include 3-day and 4-day windows, where we again begin the day before the event, but then extend the window an additional 2 or 3 days from the event day, respectively. Thus our primary cumulative abnormal return is then simply:
where 0 is the event day.
The Impact of Incident
Once we calculate our cumulative abnormal returns (CAR) through a …nancial event study on every …rm facing an adverse event, our …nal step is to examine any relationship between the product CSR level and the respective CAR via a cross sectional regression. In particular, we specify the following:
CAR i is the cumulative abnormal return for …rm i as calculated in the previous section.
The coe¢ cients of interest are again in the vector ; our CSR ratings. Now we include industry controls using NAICS codes. Ideally, we would like to control at the 3-digit level. However, we only have 192 to 242 observations, depending on the speci…cation. Hence, using 3-digit level …xed e¤ect estimation requires close to as many coe¢ cient estimates as observations, yielding a rather imprecise regression. Thus, for comparison, we also include analysis at the 2-digit level. [ Table 4 about here]
As predicted by our theory, high-types in Product CSR save a substantial amount of abnormal …rm value upon an event-some 2.5-3.2%. This e¤ect is also economically signi…cant, as it amounts to an average saved …rm value of close to $1 billion for the average …rm experiencing an event. 5 In all, this suggests our theory is missing something. How could investing in moral capital cause a reduction in …rm value? It turns out that if we allow for some strategic moralcapital-building …rms, these results can rationalized, which we explore in the next section.
Greenwashing
Let us now allow that there could also be some …rms that make disingenuous CSR Contributions in hopes of enhancing short-term …rm value. In terms of environmental CSR, this is often called greenwashing (see Lyon and Maxwell (2011) for an extended explanation).
In this paper, we refer to greenwashing to mean making disingenuous CSR Contributions as opposed to disingenuous environmental CSR.
Assume that stakeholders cannot determine if CSR Contributions are genuine until after an event occurs. After an event does occur, investigations lead to information that was not publicly available before such an event. Thus, after an event, …rms that have been greenwashing are penalized (e.g., Lyon and Maxwell (2011) ). This conceptualization of greenwashing can be captured in our setting by simply assuming that upon an event, greenwashing …rms experience M < 0. That is, they are penalized for having been discovered greenwashing.
Thus, we have two types of …rms that make CSR Contributions: true …rms and greenwash …rms, denoted as T and G; respectively. The former are those that we have modelled thus far: they enjoy reduced event cost from M T > 0; as before. In contrast, greenwash …rms have reduced moral capital upon an event: M G < 0. That is, if discovered, such a …rm would have been better o¤ not greenwashing. Recall that a …rm that makes no Contribution (i.e., a low-type Contribution …rm) receives M = 0:
It is then straightforward to show that upon an event, given enough greenwashing …rms, those …rms that invest in moral capital have on average a greater loss in …rm value than those that do not invest in moral capital. That is, genuine moral capital building …rms still enjoy protection, but a su¢ cient number of penalized greenwash …rms cause the average of all …rms to be negative. Further, as can be shown, as long as there are not too many greenwash …rms, investing in CSR Contributions can still produce positive net present value for both greenwash and genuine CSR Contribution …rms. This means that we can still witness CSR Contributions in equilibrium.
In terms of event rates, greenwash …rms will have lower incident rates than genuine Contribution …rms. This is because greenwash …rms anticipate that if they do have an event it will be more costly, thus increasing the …rm's incentive and e¤ort to limit the chances of an event. If we assume that greenwash …rms are more likely to reside in medium-rather than high-type …rm categories, then we would expect to observe our empirical results:
medium-type …rms CSR Contribution …rms should be less likely to have an event and
should have a more negative event return. These two predictions are true empirically when comparing coe¢ cient estimates via a Wald test for coe¢ cient estimates reported in column (4) in Table 2 and Table 4 , respectively: p-values of approximately :0000 and :06;
respectively. Now we consider some alternative explanations for our baseline results.
Additional Considerations
One concern in estimating these …rm value e¤ects is that abnormal return may simply be the expected direct cost (e.g., the cost of replacing faulty automobile tires) of the product recall. If the CSR level is related with actual event cost, this in itself would be interesting, as it indicates that CSR predicts the magnitudes of …rms'direct event costs. In this case, there is less room for our CSR protection story where the …nancial market prices a company upon an event as a function of uncertainty over the degree of negligence. Unfortunately, the expected direct cost of a product recall is seldom made public (nor is it commonly disclosed ex-post). However, for our sample, roughly 10% of the announcements were accompanied by estimates of the direct event costs. For this subsample, the direct costs explain roughly 16% of the variation in CAR. Further, when a loss is sustained by a …rm (i.e., a negative CAR), the direct costs represent 38% of the total loss on average. In absolute value terms (because occasionally a …rm has a positive CAR during an event), direct costs represent 26% of the value of CAR. Thus, while this sub-sample is only a small portion of the events 6 , it suggests that it is not the expected direct cost of an event driving di¤erences in CAR. Further, the direct costs have a small di¤erence in cost, whereas the change in abnormal …rm value varies widely, suggesting there is much more than just product recall direct cost embedded in the CAR. Our theory suggests that the CAR should be a combination of direct recall loss and (expected) …nancial loss.
Another concern is that CSR ratings might simply serve as a proxy for a …rm's product quality and safety and thus the ratings do not really capture any notion of corporate citizenship. That is, product CSR is highly (positively) correlated with a …rm's reputation for product safety. It could be that investors simply update the expected cost of the …rm's event based on how safe the company's products are: the safer the products, the more likely the …nal cost will be less for a …rm. To explore this possibility we disaggregate the regressors to include each of the eight KLD rating areas with all of the controls used in column 4
from Table 2 . We …nd one standalone subcategory that marginally explains the di¤erential CARs: market practices. The point estimate is :03 with a p-value of 11%. Thus, if a …rm is involved in some illegal or unethical market-practice dispute (e.g., predatory pricing or collusion), it loses an additional 3% of abnormal …rm value. Meanwhile, KLD's measure of "product safety" reputation is not signi…cant (p-value of 57%). In all, this suggests, just as KLD claims, that their ratings have something to do with corporate citizenship and not only product safety.
For estimating the value of protection of …rm value, we have used 1-day event windows. This is the strictest speci…cation, as it minimizes the chances that a really important additional piece of news on a later day somehow contaminated the event e¤ect. To explore this possibility, I redid all of the analysis that yielded Table 4 using a 3-day window and also a 4-day window. That is, I calculated the abnormal return as occurring from the day before until 2 and 3 days after the event day, respectively. These results are reported in Table 5 and Table 6 , and as expected, are consistent with those presented in Table 4 .
This suggests that any new news or orthogonal shocks experienced in the immediate days following the event are not enough to (abnormally) change the value of the …rm.
[ Tables 5 and 6 about here]
One can also estimate what a …rm should pay for such conscientiousness to see if the above estimates are reasonable. In terms of bene…t, a …rm moving from low-type to high-type via CSR Investment saves some $1 billion of …rm value conditional on an event, as shown in section (2:5) . With an incident rate of .9%, this means a risk neutral …rm should be willing to pay up to $9 million per annum more to be a higher rather than low CSR type. 7 It would be useful to compare this …gure with what …rms actually spend on these e¤orts. Unfortunately, this level of expense …gures is rarely made public. However, for one example, Merck reported its 2010 annual report total spending on CSR related activities of $9.8 million. Although this is only data from a single SP500 …rm, this provides an instance in which the above estimates are reasonable. Hopefully, public disclosure of its CSR expenses will become more common, allowing us to identify actual CSR expenditures by …rms in the future.
Concluding discussion
We found an explanation to the puzzle of why managers invest in CSR when it has no apparent e¤ect on pro…ts: Managers use CSR as a means to protect …rm value. However, there are two di¤erent mechanisms scholars have proposed, which we formalized in this paper. The …rst and most common one is the notion that managers use CSR to build moral capital, which we termed CSR Contributions. This reservoir of goodwill can then be drawn upon should the …rm face an adverse event. However, a consequence of this, which is not identi…ed in the extant literature, is that managers will engage in moral hazard and actually increase the chances of adverse events. To the extent increased incident rates are the result of reduced managerial e¤ort, we found this moral hazard result to be true in the data. Meanwhile, we found that if some …rms are strategic and engage in greenwashing to arti…cially in ‡ate valuations, such moral capital building might actually cause increased losses in …rm value upon an event. We found some suggestive empirical evidence of this, as well.
In contrast to CSR Contributions, the other proposed mechanism consists of managers investing in CSR related to a potential adverse event. For this setting, in equilibrium, those …rms with higher levels of CSR related to the issue over which they face an adverse event are less likely to have been negligent. Thus, these kinds of …rms both have events less often and are punished less severely upon an event. We found the data to support both of these predictions of so-called CSR Investments.
In conclusion, both of these mechanisms seem to be operating, although CSR Contributions seems to be operating in some unanticipated ways compared to the extant literature.
Consequently, it is only CSR through the second mechanism that seems to provide protection, on average. 
and after substituting with equation (4) ; we obtain 
Next, notice that the function
is strictly decreasing in x: Therefore, the value of the expression in the curly brackets in equation (12) is at most one. Since L H < 1; it then follows that the RHS equation (12) is fractional, which contradicts the hypothesis that L e L = H e H 1.
Proposition 2 Compared with CSR Investment low-type …rms, CSR Investment high-type …rms have events less often and lose less value upon an event. Proof. To ease notation, de…ne Pr(E j t)
Though we could solve for e t explicitly using the quadratic formula, it is much simpler to use the fact that we always have e L L < e H H in equilibrium (Lemma 1). Indeed, this inequality implies that the CSR investing …rm is less likely to have an event. That is, it is then we have Pr(E j H) < Pr(E j L) and E[C j H] < E[C j L]. 8 Proposition 3 Compared with CSR Contribution low-type …rms, CSR Contribution high-type …rms have events more often and lose less value upon an event.
Proof. Holding t I …xed, since M > 0; a lesser e t solves e t = t I (p h p l ) (t) K
This implies that high-type CSR Contribution …rms have a greater chance of experiencing an event since @ Pr(Ejt) @et < 0. Thus, as opposed to the case of CSR Investments, there are opposing forces in determining the net expected cost E[C j t] upon an event. On the one hand the moral capital M built helps the …rm upon an event, but investors further discount the value of the …rm due to the likelihood of increased negligence (i.e., a greater (t)): To see the value of moral capital M dominates the negative e¤ect of (t) ; we rewrite
:
Taking the derivative with respect to M yields
where the inequality results since @e t @M < 0.
5 Appendix: KLD Accountability Reporting of CSR KLD forms Good and Bad CSR from the following sub-categories of analysis:
Volunteer Programs: The company has an exceptionally strong volunteer program. In 2005, KLD added the Volunteer Programs Strength.
Other Strengths: The company has either an exceptionally strong in-kind giving program or engages in other notably positive community activities.
Bad CSR Investment Controversies: The company is a …nancial institution whose lending or investment practices have led to controversies, particularly ones related to the Community Reinvestment Act.
Negative Economic Impact: The company's actions have resulted in major controversies concerning its economic impact on the community. These controversies can include issues related to environmental contamination, water rights disputes, plant closings, "put-or-pay" contracts with trash incinerators, or other company actions that adversely a¤ect the quality of life, tax base, or property values in the community.
Indigenous Peoples Relations: The company has been involved in serious controversies
with indigenous peoples that indicate the company has not respected the sovereignty, land, culture, human rights, and intellectual property of indigenous peoples. KLD began assigning this concern in 2000. In 2002 KLD moved this strength rating into the Human Rights area. Other Concern: The company is involved with a controversy that has mobilized community opposition, or is engaged in other noteworthy community controversies. t statistics in parentheses * p<0.10 ** p<0.05 *** p<.01
Figure 1: A Probability Tree for the Likelihood of Firm Events
Firm effort is , firm type is , and ℎ and are the probability of the firm in a high and low risk state experiencing an event, respectively.
